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 4 
Overview 
 
Secure group communication in an ad hoc network is a largely unexplored research area.  
While there exist group key exchange protocols, a recent M.S. project [8] showed that 
various forms of the Group Diffie-Hellman protocol become computationally infeasible 
quickly as group sizes increase.  Moreover, currently available protocols were not designed to 
be implemented in an ad hoc network where nodes sporadically enter and leave the group.  
This project explores establishing secure group communication in an ad hoc network 
through public key infrastructure. 
 
Public key infrastructure (PKI) provides a framework for establishing and authenticating 
secure communication between devices.  A trusted certificate authority (CA) generates an 
identifying token, or certificate, for an authorized device.  The certificate contains the 
device’s public key and other identifying information and is digitally signed by the CA to 
prevent forging.  This public key may be used to initiate secure communication with a 
device.  In addition, any devices not possessing a valid certificate will be denied from 
communicating with the rest of the ad hoc group.  PKI is often used in traditional 
client/server architectures – a browser establishing an SSL session with a secure web server 
for example.  This project migrates the concepts of PKI to the ad hoc arena. 
 
This project uses the tuple space distributed computing paradigm for all ad hoc group 
communication.  A tuple space is a store of tuples, or lists of objects, from which consumers 
may read tuples matching filter criteria and to which producers may post new tuples [4].  An 
easily made physical analogy to this concept is that of an announcement board, where people 
may read flyers and post new ones.  While several implementations of tuple spaces in Java 
exist, (IBM’s TSpaces [5], for example) they employ a client/server architecture which is 
incompatible with the ad hoc network setting for this project.  Professor Kaminsky’s 
TupleBoard API [7] is an implementation of tuple space designed for developing ad hoc 
distributed applications in Java.  This middleware library is the basis for all work done during 
this project.  
 
While the main focus of the project is adding security to the TupleBoard library an equally 
important second step is the development of an application showcasing the newly added 
features.  The market for digital music has exploded in recent years.  Unfortunately, much of 
the media available from online music outlets (e.g. ITunes, Napster) is crippled by the plague 
of DRM (Digital Rights Management).  Therefore I created an ad hoc music distribution 
network which does not infringe on fair use rights but also provides resistance to piracy 
through the encryption, authentication and authorization mechanisms developed during the 
project. 
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Related Work 
 
In order to establish secure group communication the exchange of encryption keys is 
required.  In the simplest group, consisting of only two users the standard Diffie-Hellman 
key exchange may be used.  In this protocol Alice chooses values a, g  and p and sends g, p 
and ga mod p to Bob.  Bob chooses value b and sends gb mod p back to Alice.  Both parties 
may now compute the shared key as gab mod p. 
 
The original protocol has some shortcomings.  It is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks 
if authentication is not performed on the exchanges.  In addition, it does not scale well when 
expanded from the simple one-to-one case described above to the many-to-many case found 
in the group setting.  In [8] Kim explores the use of and improves two Group Diffie-
Hellman schemes – Authenticated Group Diffie-Hellman (A-GDH) and Strong 
Authenticated Group Diffie-Hellman (SA-GDH).  Through timing measurements Kim 
concludes that for small groups these protocols may suffice, but any system designed to 
support groups larger than 20 – 30 nodes will not be able to use them due to the rapid 
growth of key exchange time as nodes are added. 
 
In addition to the initial key exchange keys should also be refreshed periodically.  If forward 
and backward secrecy is of concern a refresh must also be performed each time the group 
membership changes.  The sporadic nature of ad hoc group activity creates an environment 
in which keys must be refreshed quite often.  It is therefore even more important that 
exchanges be performed as quickly as possible. 
 
There also exist tree-based key management schemes which build on the concepts presented 
but also attempt to minimize the cost of key exchanges and refreshes by aggregating all 
refreshes in a specific time window into one or limiting the scope of the refresh to 
subgroups [9].  Examples of these protocols include Tree-based Group Diffie-Hellman 
(TGDH), Block-Free Tree-based Group Diffie-Hellman (BF-TGDH) and Distributed 
Scalable Secure Communication (DISEC). 
  
In a PKI based system such as the one developed for this project group symmetric key 
exchange is trivial.  Since the group private key is contained in each user certificate group 
symmetric keys may be posted encrypted with the group public key.  In addition the 
authentication of group members and keys is provided via digital signatures on each message 
exchanged.  Key refreshes are performed in the same manner as the initial key exchange, by 
posting a new encrypted symmetric key.  Details of how these protocols are implemented 
appear in the next section, SecureTupleBoard API: Design & Implementation.
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Secure TupleBoard API: Design & 
Implementation 
 
When this project was started the TupleBoard API included only limited security.  Package 
edu.rit.crypto.hash provides support for two hashing algorithms, SHA-256 and Double SHA-
256, as well as an abstract OneWayHash base class for extensibility.  Symmetric key 
encryption is supported by package edu.rit.crypto.helix which contains an implementation of 
the Helix stream cipher[3].  Tuples could be securely transferred over the network through 
the FixedHelixSecurityContext found in package edu.rit.tb.security which is backed by this cipher, 
however the symmetric key had to be agreed upon offline prior to the transfer.   
 
The remainder of this section describes the security additions made to the library, namely 
secure pseudorandom number generation, public key cryptography and digital signatures.  
 
 
Generating Randomness 
 
A vital part of any cryptographic library is the ability to generate random data.  Here, the 
term ‘random’ is used as a generalization.  Truly random data is often hard to obtain and 
harder to evaluate its quality.  Luckily it is easy to obtain pseudorandom data - seemingly 
random sequences of bytes deterministically generated from an initial seed.  Java provides a 
pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) class java.util.random but this is not sufficient for 
use in cryptographic protocols. 
 
An obvious application of a PRNG is creation of encryption keys.  However a standard 
PRNG is often predictable, and if broken compromises the integrity of all keys it generates.  
To combat this problem we need a cryptographically strong PRNG, one that eliminates the 
predictability factor.  While Java also provides a cryptographically strong PRNG in class 
java.security.SecureRandom, Professor Kaminsky asked me to create my own implementation 
for the TupleBoard API. 
 
Luckily it is fairly straightforward to create a PRNG from a stream cipher such as Helix.  
Stream ciphers generally encrypt a plaintext by XORing it with a randomly generated key 
stream initialized with the encryption key.  Here the key is analogous to the seed of a PRNG 
and the key stream represents the sequence of randomly generated bits.  Class 
edu.rit.crypto.helix.HelixRandom provides a cryptographically strong PRNG based on the Helix 
cipher. 
 7 
 
Fig. 1 – A cryptographically strong PRNG based on the Helix stream cipher 
 
 
The concept for this algorithm was derived by modifying an algorithm found in Practical 
Cryptography [2] for creating a PRNG using a block cipher such as AES.  When the PRNG 
is seeded it initializes a new instance of Helix using the specified seed.  Random data is then 
retrieved through the nextBytes() method which simply encrypts the value 0 to obtain the 
XOR of the random key stream.  The class is used throughout the TupleBoard library and is 
mentioned multiple times in this section.  Guidelines for its use may be found in the 
Developer’s Guide, found later in this document. 
 
 
 
Public Key Algorithms 
 
In order to have a public key infrastructure it is first necessary to have public key algorithms 
to back it.  The primary difference of public key encryption algorithms from their symmetric 
key counterparts such as Helix is that the encryption and decryption keys are different.  Also, 
the security of these algorithms is based on intractable computational problems such as 
factoring large numbers or solving discrete logarithms.  Encrypting and decrypting data 
using a public key algorithm is much more computationally expensive than the same 
operations in a symmetric key system.  Because of this the use of public key cryptography is 
generally limited in practical applications to situations where the amount of data to be 
encrypted is small.  In the TupleBoard library it used for exchanging symmetric keys and 
digital signatures. 
 
When designing this part of the API I tried to make it as general as possible to allow for 
additional algorithms to be added in the future. 
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Fig. 2 – Public Key Algorithms 
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I created a factory class, PKIAlgorithmFactory to specify the available algorithms and simplify 
the creation of instances of the algorithms in the edu.rit.crypto.pki package.  In addition I 
created abstract base classes for both public key encryption algorithms and digital signature 
algorithms.  Class PublicKeyAlgorithm defines data members common to any algorithm such as 
the bit strength and provides an interface compatible with the new PublicKeySecurityContext 
defined later in this document.  This allows any extending algorithm classes to be simply 
plugged in and used to securely post tuples to the tuple board.  Similarly, class 
SignatureAlgorithm provides common signature algorithm fields and behaviors and allows for 
an extending class to compute and verify digital signatures using any combination of 
OneWayHash and PublicKeyAlgorithm. 
 
 
RSA 
 
With the interfaces defined the next step was to develop a concrete implementation of a 
public key encryption algorithm.  RSA is probably the most well known algorithm in this 
category.  It is also quite easy to implement in Java, thanks to the java.math.BigInteger class 
which already includes methods for performing modular exponentiation, primality testing 
and modular inverse calculation.  
 
RSA is elegant in its simplicity.  The basic parameters of the algorithm include e, the 
encryption exponent, d, the decryption exponent and n, the composite modulus.  Encryption 
and decryption are both only a modular exponentiation operation.  To encrypt: c = me (mod 
n).  To decrypt: m = cd (mod n), although this operation can be sped up using additional 
private parameters and Chinese remaindering. 
 
The first step in implementing the algorithm is to generate the composite modulus, n.  The 
algorithm I implemented for doing so is taken from Practical Cryptography[2].  The modulus 
is defined to be the product of two large primes, so the first step is to generate two large 
prime numbers, p and q.  Each prime should be approximately b/2 bits in length, where b is 
the desired length in bits of the binary representation of n. 
 
The private method generatePrime() handles generation of these primes.  First, an instance of 
the HelixRandom PRNG generates b/8 random bytes which are then interpreted as a positive 
BigInteger.  The resulting number is then verified to not be congruent to 1 modulo e and is 
tested for primality using the BigInteger’s isProbablePrime() method.  If both of these conditions 
are true the number is returned, otherwise the method loops until a suitable number has 
been found. 
 
Once both p and q have been generated the instance of RSA may be created.  Public 
exponents are static in my implementation.  Instances of RSA destined for use as encryption 
algorithms use e = 3, while those used as signature algorithms use e = 5.  Public instances are 
initialized with only the public parameters: the encryption exponent e and the modulus 
n = pq.  This instance is capable of performing encryption only.   
Private instances are initialized with all the parameters: e and n as specified in the public 
instance as well as the two primes, p and q, the private exponent d = e-1 (mod (p-1)*(q-1)) and 
qInvP = q-1 (mod p).  The last parameter is precomputed to increase efficiency of the 
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decryption computation.  Rather than computing m = cd (mod n), we can compute a = cd 
(mod p) and b = cd (mod q) and then use Garner’s Formula, m = (((a-b)/qInvp) mod p)*q+b to 
recombine the modular parts and retrieve m.  Timing measurements during implementation 
showed this CRT based implementation to be 2 to 3 times faster than the naïve approach. 
 
For additional information on generating instances of RSA and its use for encrypting data 
please see the Developer’s Guide found later in this document. 
 
 
 
RSAWithDoubleSHA256 
 
Once the implementation of RSA completed it was then possible to create a digital signature 
algorithm based upon it.  Digital signatures offer two main benefits.  First, they provide an 
authentication mechanism.  If a message signature verifies correctly it confirms the identity 
of the sender of the message.  Since only the sender would have known the private key used 
in signing, the signature must have been sent by the expected source.  Second, they provide 
an integrity check on the contents of the message itself.  Since the contents of the message 
are hashed during signing any tampering or loss of data during transmission will cause the 
verification to fail.  If the message signature verifies correctly it confirms that the message 
itself is intact. 
 
Class RSADoubleSHA256Signature represents a concrete instance of class SignatureAlgorithm.  
Like the name suggests the algorithm pairs an instance of RSA with an instance of 
DoubleSHA256Hash.   
 
Class SignatureAlgorithm provides two methods for computing signatures.  The first, sign(), 
takes any OneWayHash as input and generates a signature as a byte array based on the output 
of the hash function.  The second, signObject() is a convenience method and takes any 
Serializable object.  This overload simply serializes the object and writes its contents to the 
OneWayHash specified by the concrete class and then calls the sign() method to finish the 
computation. 
 
Similarly, there are also two methods for verifying signatures.  These function in exactly the 
same way as the signing methods.  The first, verify() takes a OneWayHash and the signature as 
a byte array and returns the result of the verification as a boolean.  The second, verifyObject(), 
is a convenience method and takes any Serializable object.  This overload simply serializes the 
object and writes its contents to the OneWayHash specified by the concrete class and then 
calls the first verify() method to finish the computation. 
 
The diagram on the following page details the steps involved in generating a signature for a 
message to be sent and verifying that signature when the message is received.  Once again, 
the implementation for this algorithm comes from Practical Cryptography[2]. 
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Fig. 3 – Computing & Verifying Signatures 
 
 
To compute a signature first the sender hashes the message to be sent.  The resulting hash is 
then used to seed a PRNG which is then used to generate a random plaintext element, r in 
the domain appropriate for the public key algorithm being used.  The signature s is 
computed by decrypting r with the sender’s private signing key, Kds.  The message and 
signature can then be sent to its intended recipient. 
 
Once the message is received the signature is verified in much the same manner as it was 
originally computed.  The message is hashed and used to seed a PRNG.  From this the 
random plaintext element r is generated.  Then the signature received, s, is encrypted using 
the signature verification key, Kes to yield r’.  The signature is determined to be valid if  
r’ == r. 
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Public Key Infrastructure 
 
Public key infrastructure (PKI) provides a framework for establishing and authenticating 
secure communication between distributed parties.  It is a trust based system wherein an 
empowered third party may create verifiable digital identities for users or devices.  This third 
party is more commonly known as a certificate authority and the digital identities as 
certificates.  Certificates are digitally signed so their content may be verified as authentic.  
They also bind public key information to a user or device, enabling secure communications 
to be initiated. 
 
With the algorithmic parts of the public key system complete the next step was to define the 
infrastructure necessary for creating, distributing and using those algorithms for secure 
group communication. Both the certificate and certificate authority were designed to be 
flexible and accommodate any type of public key encryption and signature algorithms.  
Below is a high level design of the certificate authority and certificates added to the 
TupleBoard library in package edu.rit.tb.security.cert.  
 
 
 
Fig. 4 – Public Key Infrastructure 
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The Certificate base class seen above contains the data fields and behavior common to any 
type of certificate based system.  Each certificate contains the ID of the user or device for 
which it was generated and the name of the CA with generated it.  Each certificate also has a 
start date and an end date, between which it is considered to be valid.  The most important 
feature of the base certificate is its signature and the inclusion of a SignatureAlgorithm capable 
of verifying this signature.  Through these the integrity of the certificate can be verified and 
the ID of its presenter confirmed authentic.  A certificate is accepted as valid if the CA’s 
verification algorithm matches the well known verification algorithm for the group, its 
signature verifies correctly using that algorithm, and the current date is after the start date 
but still before the end date. 
 
While this simple certificate may be sufficient for very basic identification purposes it does 
not give the possessor the ability to receive encrypted messages or send signed messages in 
TB.  Class AlgorithmWalletCertificate extends the base Certificate class and adds fields for a 
public key encryption algorithm and a signature algorithm for precisely this reason.  
Internally the certificate stores these algorithms in an AlgorithmWallet, which is simply a data 
holder class for public key algorithms.  Instead of keys the wallet contains instances of the 
algorithms initialized with the necessary keys.  The wallet may also be public or private.  A 
private wallet contains public key algorithms capable of both encryption and decryption (and 
therefore capable of creating and verifying signatures).  A public wallet may only encrypt 
data and verify signatures.  In this manner the user may keep the private instance of the 
wallet but distribute the public instance in an AlgorithmWalletCertificate so other users may 
verify the user’s signatures and also send encrypted messages capable of being decrypted 
only by that user. 
 
With the certificates defined there now needs to be a certificate authority to generate them.  
Class CertificateAuthority provides this capability.  The CA is created with a name, public key 
encryption algorithm and a signature algorithm.  The CA’s name serves as the group ID.  
The public key algorithm is included in all certificates created and allows group users to 
encrypt messages only other certificate possessing users have the capability of decrypting.  
The signature algorithm is used to digitally sign each certificate generated.  The 
createAlgorithmWalletCertificate() method performs the creation of the certificate.  Invoking the 
method results in the creation of two files – one containing the user’s serialized private 
wallet and the other containing the user’s serialized public certificate. 
 
Finally, there needs to be a method of persistent storage for the certificate authority and 
certificates between application sessions.  Serialization is a good candidate for this 
requirement, especially since certificates must be serializable to be sent over the network 
anyway.  That is why all classes above derive from the common base class 
edu.rit.io.StreamSerializable.  This class simply defines convenience methods fromStream() and 
toStream() for serializing and deserializing these objects to and from streams. 
 
Please see the Developer’s Guide and the User Manual found later in this document for 
more information regarding creating CA’s and generating certificates. 
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Public Key Encryption in TB 
 
With all the public key infrastructure pieces now in place a new SecurityContext had to be 
created to support transferring tuples using public key encryption.  Class 
PublicKeySecurityContext enables the transfer of a tuple encrypted such that only a user 
possessing the corresponding private instance of a public key algorithm may decrypt its 
contents.  As mentioned earlier, public key encryption is not used for bulk encryption 
operations, but is often used to transfer an encrypted symmetric key which the data will 
actually be encrypted with.  Below is the design for the new PublicKeySecurityContext. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5 – Public Key Security Context 
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A public key security context is initialized with a public key algorithm capable of encrypting 
data able to be decrypted only by the target user(s) and a PRNG to be used for generating a 
symmetric data transfer key.  The getInputStream() and getOutputStream() methods simply return 
new instances of the PublicKeyInputStream and PublicKeyOutputStream classes pictured above. 
These classes handle the generation, encryption and decryption of the symmetric key and 
then delegate all further I/O to the HelixInputStream and HelixOutputStream classes.  The 
implementation of these two classes is based largely on the protocol established between the 
two Helix streams. 
 
The following diagram illustrates the steps performed when transferring a tuple posted to 
the tuple board using the PublicKeySecurityContext. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6 – Public Key Encryption 
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First, the sender initializes a new instance of PublicKeySecurityContext with the public key 
algorithm of the target user and posts a tuple to the board using this context.  When the 
tuple is read by the receiver a new PublicKeyOutputStream is created on the sender side.  This 
object generates a random plaintext element r using the generateRandomPlaintext() method of 
the public key algorithm.  It then computes x by encrypting r with the receiver’s public key 
Ker and writes this value onto the stream. 
 
Meanwhile on the receiving side a new instance of PublicKeyInputStream is created by the 
receivers corresponding PublicKeySecurityContext object.  The input stream reads the value x 
and decrypts it using the private key Kdr to obtain r. 
 
Now that both parties now have the value r the underlying symmetric key algorithm, Helix, 
may be initialized.  The sender and receiver both hash the value r to obtain the symmetric 
key Kh.  A new HelixOutputStream is initialized on the sending side with the symmetric key 
and a randomly generated nonce, N,  which is transferred first.  At the same time the 
receiving side initializes a new HelixKeyInputStream with the same key and reads the nonce 
value from the stream.  From this point on all further I/O operations are delegated through 
these objects. 
 
As an added bonus the Helix algorithm also computes a message authentication code, or 
MAC while encrypting a plaintext.  When all serialized tuple data has been transferred the 
HelixOutputStream writes this code to the stream before closing it.  The HelixInputStream on 
the other side can then read this code and compare it to its locally computed MAC to verify 
the authenticity and integrity of the received tuple. 
 
 
 
 
Digital Signatures in TB 
 
In order to support digital signatures in the TupleBoard library a new SignedTuple type was 
created.  This class extends Tuple and so may be used in the same manner traditional tuples 
are used.  SignedTuple adds fields for an AlgorithmWalletCertificate and a signature.  The class 
may not be directly instantiated, as its constructor is protected.  Subclasses should provide a 
static create() method in which the object is fully initialized and signed before being returned.   
 
The signature is computed using the SignatureAlgorithm specified at creation time in the 
manner described previously.  The message being signed is generally the serialized contents 
of the object itself.  An example of this usage may be found in the Developer’s Guide later 
in this document.  Below is the overall design of the digital signature implementation in TB.  
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Fig. 7 – Digital Signatures in TB 
 
 
When a SignedTuple is created and its signature initialized as described above it is ready to be 
posted to the tuple board.  This is done no differently than a standard tuple.  However, upon 
reading the signed tuple from the tuple board the receiver has the ability to verify its validity 
and authenticity.  This operation is provided by the isAuthentic() method.    
 
Three separate checks are performed by this method.  First, the enclosed 
AlgorithmWalletCertificate is checked for expiration.  If this test passes the CA’s signature on 
that certificate is verified.  If this check also succeeds then the signature on the tuple itself is 
verified using the signature verification algorithm found in the certificate.  In this manner the 
authenticity of the tuple may be established. 
 
Additional information regarding how to sign and verify tuples may be found in the 
Developer’s Guide later in this document.  Details on the specific instances of signed tuples 
used in this project are presented in the next section, Music Group Application: Design & 
Implementation. 
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MusicGroup Application: Design & 
Implementation 
 
Once the security additions to TupleBoard API were complete the second phase of the 
project could begin.  The goal of this phase was to create an ad hoc music distribution 
application utilizing the new secure tuple board.  In this system role-based certificates would 
govern access to and permissions within music groups within the application.  The system 
must be resistant to piracy by only permitting song downloads from authorized providers to 
authorized subscribers.  In addition all communication must be encrypted to prevent 
unauthenticated users from gaining access to the secure group or any data transferred 
between users. 
 
 
Song Metadata 
 
The first step in developing the application was to define a set of metadata classes to 
represent music files. 
 
 
Fig. 8 – Metadata Classes 
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The metadata classes can be divided into two categories – entity classes and collection 
classes.  Entity classes SongInfo and AlbumInfo contain useful information about songs and 
albums respectively.  The remaining collection classes allow for entity objects to be easily 
stored, iterated over and queried.  All classes are able to be serialized to disk or over the 
network. 
 
The SongInfo class is the real workhorse of the metadata classes.  This class contains a great 
deal of information about an mp3 file, including physical format data like bit rate and song 
length as well as data about the song itself, such as the album on which it appears (via an 
AlbumInfo object), the track number on that album and obviously the artist and song title.  
This class also has the ability to initialize its data members directly from an mp3 file by 
reading its ID3 tags and MPEG header data.  This functionality is provided by the open 
source Java ID3 Tag Library[1]. 
 
The SongCollection class represents a collection of songs.  This class is used widely in the 
application, from parsing local media libraries at startup to informing subscribers of available 
media from providers.  Further details on how this is done appear later in this section. 
 
The remaining collection classes were designed mainly for authorization duties.  As 
mentioned previously song transfers in the system are only permitted between authorized 
users.  A user is considered authorized to participate in a transfer if a MusicCollection object 
containing the requested song is associated with that user.  MusicCollection objects are created 
and associated with users by a newly created music certificate authority discussed in detail a 
little later. 
 
 
Roles and Authorizations 
 
The application currently supports two roles, subscriber and provider.  In addition to the 
general group activities supported such as sending and receiving public and private messages, 
subscribers are permitted to download songs.  Providers are allowed to provide songs for 
download to subscribers.   
 
In order for group activity to be regulated through roles and transfer permissions a new 
certificate authority and certificate had to be created to associate these permissions with 
users.  Class MusicAuthorizationCertificate handles the binding of a role and a catalog of 
authorized music to a user.  For a provider certificate the catalog specifies the songs the 
provider may distribute.  Similarly, in a subscriber certificate it specifies the songs the 
subscriber may request for download.  Class MusicCertificateAuthority enables generation of 
these new certificates.  This certificate authority is analogous to a record label, permitting 
distribution of songs on a per user basis.  The certificate is like a user license to provide or 
obtain songs.  Below is a design diagram of these new classes. 
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Fig. 9 – Music Authorization Framework 
 
 
Each MusicAuthorizatinCertificate contains authorizations for one role and one MusicCollection.  
A group user may have one or more certificates specifying roles and the music 
authorizations associated with each.  The class contains a static loadCertificatesFromDisk() 
method to provide easy support for deserializing these certificates for use in the application.  
The certificate also contains an isAuthorized() method for determining whether a specific 
song is authorized according to that certificate.  Music authorizations are performed in a 
multi-tier fashion.  A song is considered authorized if any of the following are true: the 
song’s artist is found in the music collection’s artists list; or the song’s album is found in the 
music collection’s albums list; or the song is found in the music collection’s songs list. 
 
Class MusicCertificateAuthority provides the ability to generate MusicAuthorizationCertificate 
objects.  The certificate authority must be initialized with the instance of the group’s 
certificate authority so that its certificate signatures may be verified by group members. 
Certificates may be created using the createCertificate() method.  More information regarding 
generating MusicAuthorizationCertificates may be found in the User’s Manual later in this 
document. 
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Application Protocols 
 
With the necessary roles and music authorizations defined tuples and protocols could be 
designed to enable collaboration between group users.  Below is a diagram containing all 
application level tuples used in the system.  Note that all tuples extend class SignedTuple, 
meaning all instances are digitally signed at creation before being posted and verified when 
read.  Any tuples unable to be correctly verified are ignored. 
 
 
Fig. 10 – Application Protocol Tuples 
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Key Exchange Protocol 
 
The first protocol necessary to facilitate group communication in the application is the 
establishment of a group symmetric key.  Luckily this is trivial because of the public key 
infrastructure in place.  Recall that each user has an AlgorithmWalletCertificate containing the 
public portions of its encryption and signature algorithms and a corresponding 
AlgorithmWallet containing the private portions.  The wallet contains an instance of the group 
public key encryption algorithm.  Using this algorithm it is possible to post encrypted tuples 
only other group members will be capable of decrypting.  If this is the case why is it 
necessary to create a group symmetric key? 
 
Technically it is not necessary.  All communication could be done securely using the group 
public key algorithm however this is inefficient.  Every time a tuple is read the associated 
PublicKeySecurityContext would have to decrypt the new random symmetric key and initialize a 
new Helix cipher.  By creating a group symmetric key each user may initialize one instance of 
FixedHelixSecurityContext for all groupwide communication. 
 
The establishment of a group symmetric key is done using the GroupExistenceTuple.  When a 
user creates a new tuple board a read is performed for any existing tuples of this type.  If the 
read succeeds the returned GroupExistenceTuple contains the current group symmetric key and 
the user may initialize an instance of FixedHelixSecurityContext using the read key.  If no tuple 
is currently available, meaning the user is the first one to join, a new GroupExistenceTuple is 
created with a randomly generated key.  This tuple is then posted to the board using a new 
PublicKeySecurityContext initialized with the group public key encryption algorithm and an ID 
of “GroupSymmetricContext” concatenated with the contents of the keyID field in the tuple.  
This additional ID field is included to prevent accidental reuse of an old security context 
identifier. 
 
The protocol also allows for periodic refreshes of the group symmetric key.  This feature is 
to prevent attacks which can arise when keys are used too many times.  The frequency with 
which the key is refreshed is controlled by the system property “tb.keyrefresh.interval”, 
specified in milliseconds.  The default value is 900000, or 15 minutes. 
 
A key refresh is performed the same way as the initial key generation.  The original poster of 
the GroupExistenceTuple withdraws the old tuple, generates a new random key and reposts a 
new tuple.  Meanwhile, all other group users are listening for tuples of this type and are 
notified of its posting and refresh their respective symmetric security contexts.  Any tuples 
which were posted using the old context are also withdrawn at this time. 
 
 
 
User Announcement Protocol 
 
Once the symmetric key security context is initialized as described above the application may 
notify any other users currently participating in the group of its arrival.  It may also gather 
information regarding the other users online and their roles.  This is the essence of the user 
announcement protocol. 
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The two tuples involved in this protocol are the ProviderTuple and the SubscriberTuple.  These 
tuples are posted to the board using the newly initialized group FixedHelixSecurityContext 
when a user authorized as a provider or subscriber begins participating in the group.  Both 
tuples contain the user’s AlgorithmWalletCertificate, enabling private communications with the 
user and the ability to verify signatures on tuples received from the user.  The ProviderTuple 
also contains a SongCollection representing the catalog of songs the provider is authorized to 
provide and has available for download.   
 
Existing group users are notified of the posting of these tuples through listeners added to 
the board during application initialization.  The listeners also are notified when these tuples 
are withdrawn, signaling that a user has left the group.  Through this protocol a current list 
of the users online and their roles may be maintained.  
 
 
 
Secure Messaging Protocol 
 
The application supports the sending and receiving of encrypted messages between users in 
the group through the secure messaging protocol.  Two types of messages are supported.  
The first is a group message.  This type of message is able to be read by all users currently 
participating in the group.  The second type is a private message.  This message is only able 
to be read by the intended recipient. 
 
The GroupMessageTuple allows for messages to be sent to the entire group.  It includes 
matchable fields for the originator of the message, the message itself, and the sequence 
number associated with the message.  These tuples are posted using the group 
FixedHelixSecurityContext so all other group members may decrypt their contents and 
successfully read the message.  Group users are notified of the posting of these tuples 
through a listener on the tuple board. 
 
The PrivateMessageTuple is very similar to the GroupMessageTuple but allows for messages to be 
sent to a single user.  In addition to the matchable fields of the GroupMessageTuple it also 
provides a field for the intended recipient.  These tuples are posted using a 
PublicKeySecurityContext initialized with the public key encryption algorithm of the recipient.  
Since only this user has the private portion of the algorithm capable of decrypting the 
message it is unable to be read by anyone but the recipient.  Group users are also notified of 
the posting of these tuples through a listener on the tuple board. 
 
Since group messages are posted using the group symmetric key context, when a key refresh 
occurs all previously posted group messages are withdrawn.  Private messages persist until 
the target user is found to be offline as described in the user announcement protocol above. 
 
More information on sending and receiving secure group messages may be found in the 
User’s Manual section later in this document. 
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Song Transfer Protocol 
 
The song transfer protocol is probably the most important protocol in the application since 
its purpose is to enable the secure and authorized distribution of music between group 
members.  It is also the most involved.  While all previously defined tuple protocols involve 
only a single step this protocol consists of a request and a response. 
 
A subscriber initiates the protocol by posting a DownloadRequestTuple.  This tuple is initialized 
with the song wishing to be downloaded, a music authorization certificate which authorizes 
the download and the target provider that should field the request.  Much like the private 
message protocol described in the previous section this tuple should be posted to the tuple 
board using a PublicKeySecurityContext initialized with the target provider’s public key 
encryption algorithm.  While this is not absolutely necessary since no truly sensitive data is 
contained in the tuple it does protect the privacy of the subscriber.  No user but the target 
provider will be able to discover what song was requested or the collection of songs the 
subscriber is authorized to download. 
 
The target provider is notified of the posting of any DownloadRequestTuples matching its 
providerID through a listener added to the tuple board during application initialization.  When 
a new tuple is received it must be verified that the requesting subscriber is actually 
authorized to download the requested song.  The tuple contains an isAuthorized() method 
which delegates to the provider authorization certificate to verify its authorization status as 
described previously in this section.  The provider must also verify that it actually has the 
requested song and is authorized to provide it.  If any of these conditions are not met the 
request is ignored. 
 
Otherwise the provider creates a new SongTransferTuple.  This tuple is initialized with the 
same SongInfo object specified in the request as well as the target and the java.io.File object 
containing the requested song in the provider’s file system.  In order to actually transfer the 
contents of the song file over the network some custom serialization must be done.  This 
tuple is based directly on the implementation of the FileTuple found in the edu.rit.tb.tuples 
package. 
 
The tuple specifies custom writeObject() and readObject() methods which are automatically 
invoked when the object is serialized and deserialized.  In addition to the serializable fields of 
the object the contents of the song file are also written to the object output stream during 
serialization.  Similarly, the contents of the song file are read from the object input stream 
when the tuple is deserialized.  Since the signature on the tuple is computed by first 
serializing it the signature includes the file contents.  Thus when the tuple is received both its 
authenticity and integrity of the file transfer may be verified.  This tuple is posted to the 
tuple board by the provider using a PublicKeySecurityContext initialized with the subscriber’s 
public key algorithm so no other users may decrypt and obtain the transferred file data. 
 
When the subscriber reads this response tuple the song file’s contents are written to a 
temporary file.  This file is then copied to the location specified by the subscriber when the 
download request was first made.  For more on how to download tuples using the 
application see the User’s Manual section located later in this document. 
 25 
Application Architecture 
 
With the tuple protocols designed and implemented the remainder of the application could 
be developed.  The application is written in multiple tiers in order to minimize coupling and 
increase reuse of developed components.  The following diagram illustrates the manner in 
which the application is organized. 
 
 
Fig. 11 – Application Architecture 
 
 
The bottom tier consists of instances of TupleListeners which are added to the tuple board 
during application initialization.  These listeners, mentioned in the protocols section above 
notify the participation manager tier of the posting and withdrawing of protocol tuples. 
 
The participation manager tier responds to events from the listener tier and provides 
abstraction from the tuple board for the application manager tier when executing application 
protocols such as messaging.  It also passes notifications of protocol activity up to the 
application tier through a custom event model. 
 
The application tier passes actions from the view tier to the participation manager tier and 
also passes events received from the participation managers to the view.  Each of these tiers 
is discussed in detail next. 
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Listener Tier 
 
The listener tier is responsible for monitoring the tuple board and notifying the participation 
manager tier when tuples are posted and withdrawn.  The implementation of this tier 
deviates slightly from the architectural diagram in that the listeners are actually implemented 
as anonymous inner classes contained within the participation manager tier.  Seven different 
listeners are supported. 
 
The first is a PostListener which listens for GroupExistenceTuples.  The template tuple used is 
simply a blank GroupExistenceTuple.  When matching tuples are posted this listener notifies its 
associated participation manager to initiate a key refresh. 
 
The next two listeners are PostWithdrawListeners and perform the reading portion of the user 
announcement protocol described earlier.  The subscriber listener uses a blank SubscriberTuple 
in order be notified when any subscribers come online or go offline.  Similarly, the provider 
listener uses a blank ProviderTuple in order to be notified when any providers come online or 
go offline. 
 
In order to implement the messaging protocol two additional PostListeners are defined.  The 
group message listener listens for incoming group messages using a blank GroupMessageTuple 
template.  The private message listener listens for incoming private messages using a 
PrivateMessageTuple template initialized with the user’s AlgorithmWalletCertificate as the to field. 
 
All of the listeners defined so far are contained within the GroupParticipationManager, a part of 
the participation manager tier responsible for all general group protocol activities.  The 
remaining two listeners are unique for each role for which the application user is authorized.  
Together they implement the song transfer protocol. 
 
The subscriber listener is only enabled if the current user is authorized as a subscriber.  This 
listener listens for any incoming song transfers using a SongTransferTuple template initialized 
with the user’s AlgorithmWalletCertificate as the target field.  Similarly, the provider listener is 
only enabled if the current user is authorized as a provider.  This listener listens for any 
incoming download requests using a DownloadRequestTuple template initialized with the user’s 
AlgorithmWalletCertificate as the providerCert field.  These listeners are contained with in role 
participation managers, the SubscriberParticipationManager and ProviderParticipationManger 
respectively.   
 
 
 
Participation Manager Tier 
 
The next application tier is the participation manager tier.  In addition to containing the 
listener tier, this tier provides abstraction from the tuple board to the rest of the application.  
Notifications received from listeners are relayed through an event model to the application 
tier.  In the opposite direction, actions requested in the application tier are delegated to this 
tier and translated into the necessary tuple protocol actions.  Below are the classes that make 
up this tier.  
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Fig. 12 – Participation Manager Tier 
 
 
The base PartitionManager class provides some functionality common to all types of 
participation managers in the tier.  It provides members for the instance of TupleBoard being 
used, a queue of event listeners to notify of manager events and a collection of tuples that 
have been posted.  The methods postTuple() and withdrawTuples() provide an easy way to track 
and remove tuples from the board for all managers.  In addition it provides an isAuthentic() 
method which verifies signatures on tuples received from listeners.  Since each manager is 
associated with a particular type of event listener from the model, generic addListener() and 
removeListener() methods are provided for modifying the listener queue for each manager. 
 
Within the tier there are two different types of managers.  The first type includes the 
GroupParticipationManager, which provides functionality common to all group users.  The 
second type is the RoleParticipationManagers, of which there are two concrete implementations 
– one for subscribers and one for providers.  These managers respond to role specific 
actions and events. 
 
The GroupParticipationManager is the heavyweight of the tier.  This manager controls the 
secure messaging protocol, the key exchange protocol and the user announcement protocol.  
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The ability to send messages is provided through the sendGroupMessage() and 
sendPrivateMessage() methods.  The key exchange protocol is executed behind the scenes 
without any interaction, although the application is notified through the event model when 
key refreshes occur.  Similarly, user announcements are posted automatically when the 
manager starts. 
 
The remaining two managers, ProviderParticipationManager and SubscriberParticipationManager 
implement the song transfer protocol.  Class ProviderParticipationManager manages the 
operations reserved for those users with the provider role, namely transferring songs to 
subscribers.  Similarly, class SubscriberParticipationManager manages the operations reserved for 
those users with the subscriber role, namely downloading songs from providers. 
 
As mentioned previously the manager classes of this tier relay events received from their 
enclosed listeners to the rest of the application through a custom event model.  Below is the 
design of the event listener interfaces which make up this model. 
 
 
 
Fig. 13 – Participation Manager Tier Event Model 
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When protocol events occur in the manager tier they are relayed to the application through 
the event interfaces specified in the model.  There is a one to one mapping between event 
listeners and participation managers. Class GroupEventListener specifies the events which are 
generated by the GroupParticipationManager.  Classes implementing this event interface are 
notified when messages are received, when providers and subscribers come online or go 
offline, and when other status messages are generated by the manager.  Class 
ProviderEventListener is a very simple listener, with only one event.  This event is fired by the 
ProviderParticipationManager when a new incoming download request is received from a 
subscriber.  Class SubscriberEventListener specifies events related to the download of songs by 
a subscriber.  These events are fired by the SubscriberParticipationManager when a download is 
started, completed, or an error occurs during while executing the protocol. 
 
 
Application Manager Tier 
 
This tier acts as the controller between the view tier and the manager tier.  Actions requested 
in the view are passed through this tier to the appropriate manager.  In addition, events 
generated through the manager tier’s event model are aggregated in this tier and relayed up 
to the view.  This tier also handles most of the necessary security for the application. 
Below is a diagram of the classes which make up this tier.  
 
 
 
Fig. 14 – Application Manager Tier 
 
Class GroupSecurityManager is implemented as a singleton and serves as a container for all 
security related processes in the application.  This class holds a PRNG and the user’s private 
algorithm wallet and public certificate as well as numerous security contexts.  In addition to 
the group and user PublicKeySecurityContexts it also maps users to their respective 
PublicKeySecurityContext for easy lookup when communicating solely with a single user. 
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Class ApplicationManager servers as the main controller between the view and manager tiers.  
This class initializes all necessary participation managers when started and relays all events 
generated by them up to the view.  The view may register listeners through the provided 
add…Listener() methods.  In addition it provides methods for initiating all of the protocols 
supported by the system through the view.  This class also represents a single point of 
storage for current group data. 
 
Current collections of the subscribers and providers currently online are maintained as well 
as the available music libraries available by each provider and the application user.  The 
manager also exposes music library search functionality, broken down by category and 
search breadth. 
 
 
View Tier 
 
The final tier in the application is the view.  This tier allows interaction with the user, sends 
collected user actions to the application manager tier and displays events and notifications 
received from the lower tiers. 
 
 
 
Fig. 15 – View Tier 
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Two different views compose this tier.  Each view implements all event listener interfaces 
defined by the participation tier’s event model.  Both views also contain an instance of class 
ApplicationManager with which it registers itself as the necessary event listeners at startup. 
 
The first view, a simple command line interface, is implemented in class MusicGroupCMD.  
In this view events received from the lower tiers are simply printed to standard out.  Users 
may interact with the system via a predetermined set of commands.  All basic application 
functionality is supported by this view, including sending and receiving group and private 
messages, downloading songs and searching. 
 
The second view, implemented in class MusicGroupGUI uses Swing to provide a graphical 
interface.  This view is much more involved than the simple command line interface and so 
requires some additional supporting classes, detailed below. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 16 – Graphical View Support 
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Class MusicTable provides a specialized extension of JTable suited for the display of song 
information and is used extensively through out the view.  Class TableSorter provides the 
ability to sort these song information tables by column.  It should be noted that this class 
was obtained from Sun’s Swing Tutorials[6].  This functionality has since been absorbed into 
the Swing library with the recent release of Java6, but since this application is designed to be 
run with Java5 had to be manually included.   
 
The final class, SongCollectionTableModel provides a custom data model for the MusicTable class 
to display.  The data model allows the association with of a user with song information and 
the ability to display this data conveniently in the application. 
 
For more information regarding usage of the application in each view mode see the User’s 
Manual section found later in this document. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 33 
Performance Evaluation 
 
Good security never comes for free.  In order to establish the impact of encryption and 
authentication on performance in the library I created a small test program, 
edu.rit.tb.music.test.PerformanceEval.  This program times how long each operation takes during 
the transfer of a SongTransferTuple from one device to another. 
 
Usage: 
%> java edu.rit.tb.music.test.PerformanceEval <certificate> <wallet> \  
<file> <-provider | -subscriber> <none | auth | full> 
 
The first two arguments specify the paths to the device’s public AlgorithmWalletCertificate and 
private AlgorithmWallet respectively.  The third argument specifies the path to the file to be 
transferred.  The fourth argument specifies this process as the posting (-provider) or reading 
(-subscriber) process.  Finally, the last argument specifies the security level of the transfer 
operation.  A value of ‘none’ causes the tuple to be posted using the DefaultSecurityContext 
and to not be authenticated by the reading process.  A value of ‘auth’ causes the tuple to still 
be posted using the DefaultSecurityContext but the signature is verified by the reading process.  
A value of ‘full’ causes the tuple to be posted using the PublicKeySecurityContext and the 
signature to also be verified by the reading process.  Note that the posting process will post 
the SongTransferTuple and wait until killed externally while the reading process will perform 
one read, print the timing results to standard out and then exit. 
 
All results were gathered running the posting process on newyork and the reading process on 
georgia, two machines on the CS network at RIT.  Both machines contained one 650MHz 
SparcV9 processor and 512MB of ram and were running Solaris 10 at the time of testing.  
The machines were connected via a 100 Mbps Ethernet link.  Three different files were 
transferred in this experiment: 
 
File 1: 11 – the american analog set – aaron and maria.mp3 (3,045,376 bytes) 
File 2: 04 – explosions in the sky – memorial.mp3 (12,775,424 bytes) 
File 3: 03 – mono – yearning.mp3 (23,527,424 bytes) 
 
Each song was transferred 100 times throughout the day at each security level (none, auth, 
full) in order to obtain these results. 
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Raw Transfer Time 
 
This test was performed as a baseline with which to compare results of adding security 
features to the transfer.  Here the song data is transferred in the clear and no authentication 
is performed by the reading process. 
 
 
 
 File 1 File 2 File 3 
Mean Transfer Time (msec) 2959.19 3840.89 4770.88 
 
Fig. 17 – Mean Raw Transfer Times 
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Fig. 18 – Raw Transfer Time 
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Signature Verification Time 
 
This test was performed in order to determine how much time signature verification by the 
reading process contributes to the total transfer time.  The signature algorithm used is 2048 
bit RSA with Double SHA-256.  Here the song data is transferred in the clear but the 
received SongTranferTuple’s signature is verified.  Note that these timing measurements reflect 
only the time to verify the signature, not the time to transfer the data. 
 
 
 
 File 1 File 2 File 3 
Mean Signature Verification Time (msec) 868.57 3384.25 6144.92 
 
Fig. 19 – Mean Signature Verification Times 
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Fig. 20 – Signature Verification Time 
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Encrypted Transfer Time 
 
This test was performed in order to determine how much time encryption and decryption 
during tuple transfer contributes to the total transfer time.  The public key algorithm used is 
2048 bit RSA.  The symmetric key algorithm used is 256 bit Helix.  No signature verification 
is performed by the reading process. 
 
 
 
 File 1 File 2 File 3 
Mean Encrypted Transfer Time (msec) 4812.44 7321.86 9920.45 
 
Fig. 21 – Mean Encrypted Transfer Times 
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Fig. 22 – Encrypted Transfer Time 
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Authenticated & Encrypted Transfer Time 
 
This test was performed in order to compare the total tuple transfer time using both 
encryption and authentication to the baseline raw transfer.  The public key algorithm used is 
2048 bit RSA.  The symmetric key algorithm used is 256 bit Helix.  The signature algorithm 
used is 2048 bit RSA with Double SHA-256.   
 
 
 
 File 1 File 2 File 3 
Mean A & E Transfer Time (msec) 5678.76 10756.11 16090.37 
 
Fig. 23 – Mean Authenticated & Encrypted Transfer Times 
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Fig. 24 – Authenticated & Encrypted Transfer Time 
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Summary 
 
Once all testing data was gathered it could be condensed and analyzed for further 
performance comparison.   
 
 None Auth Full 
File 1 2959.19 3831.77 5678.76 
File 2 3840.89 7261.05 10756.11 
File 3 4770.88 11068.69 16090.37 
 
Fig. 25 – Mean Total Transfer Times at Various Security Levels 
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None: t = 0.00009B + 2697  R2 = 0.9958 Rate: 88.89 Mbps Overhead: 2697 msec 
Auth:  t = 0.0004B + 2752 R2 = 0.9791 Rate: 20.00 Mbps Overhead: 2752 msec 
Full:  t = 0.0005B + 4177  R2 = 0.9923 Rate: 16.00 Mbps Overhead: 4177 msec 
 
Fig. 26 – Transfer Times & Rates at Various Security Levels 
 
As expected, transfer times at all security levels increase linearly with the size of the file.  In 
addition the rate of increase itself grows as authentication and encryption are added to the 
transfer.  These results clearly illustrate the tradeoff between security and speed.  It is 
therefore important to evaluate the environment in which the library is being used and select 
a security level appropriate for the desired level of performance. 
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User’s Manual 
 
The software described in this user’s manual expects that certain jar files be on the class path 
in order to function correctly.  Please refer to the Deliverables section found later in this 
document for more information regarding these required jars. 
 
Required jar files: 
• Latest TupleBoard API (tb.jar) 
• Latest MusicGroup Application (musicgroup.jar) 
• Java ID3 Tab Library (jid3lib-0.5.4.jar) 
• NetBeans[11] Swing Absolute Positioning Library (AbsoluteLayout.jar, required only 
for graphical MusicGroup client) 
 
The first entity which must be present in order to establish public key infrastructure is a 
certificate authority.  In the TupleBoard API this is represented by class 
edu.rit.tb.security.cert.CertificateAuthority.  This class comes equipped with a main method which 
enables creation of a CA and generation of certificates for distribution to devices. 
 
 
Create a Certificate Authority 
 
Before any certificates may be generated a static CA must first be created.  The CA must be 
persistent across usage sessions because the signatures on all certificates must be verifiable 
by any device in the group regardless of when its certificate was generated.  A certificate 
authority may be created by invoking the following command: 
 
%> java edu.rit.tb.security.cert.CertificateAuthority –create \ 
<caName> <signatureAlgorithm> <encryptionAlgorithm> <bitStrength> \    
<caFile> 
 
Note: ‘\’ denotes a line continuation; there should be no newlines in the argument list. 
 
Argument descriptions: 
 
<caName> - The name of the certificate authority.  This should be unique as this name is 
also used internally as the group identifier during secure communication. 
 
<signatureAlgorithm> - The name of the signature algorithm to use when signing 
certificates.  The value of this parameter must be able to be parsed as an instance of the 
edu.rit.tb.pki.PKIAlgorithmFactory.SignatureAlgorithms enumeration.  Currently supported values: 
{ RSAWithDoubleSHA256} 
 
<encryptionAlgorithm> - The name of the encryption algorithm to be used for group   
The value of this parameter must be able to be parsed as an instance of the 
edu.rit.tb.pki.PKIAlgorithmFactory.SignatureAlgorithms enumeration.  Currently supported values: 
{ RSA} 
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<bitStrength> - The bit strength of the algorithms.  For the RSA encryption and 
signature algorithms this is the bit size of the public modulus, n. For RSA based algorithms 
this argument should be >= 2048. 
 
<caFile> - The file to which the resulting CertificateAuthority object will be serialized for 
persistent storage. 
 
The program will generate the public/private key pairs required for the signature and 
encryption algorithms and then serialize the resulting CertificateAuthority object to disk at the 
location specified.  Generation of a 2048 bit RSA/RSAWithDoubleSHA256 certificate 
authority generally takes 8-10 minutes on a 650MHz SparcV9 CPU or 1 minute on a 1.8GHz 
Pentium M CPU. 
 
Example: 
 
%> java edu.rit.tb.security.cert.CertificateAuthority –create 
groupOne RSAWithDoubleSHA256 RSA 2048 groupOne.ca 
 
Creating CA signature public/private key pair... 
 
Creating group encryption public private key pair... 
 
Writing CA to /home/stu9/s15/krm4686/courses/msproj/data/groupOne.ca... 
 
%> 
 
 
 
Generate a Certificate 
 
Once a certificate authority has been created device certificates may begin to be generated.  
In order to participate in secure group communication a device must have a valid certificate 
from the group CA.  Device certificates are represented in the API by class 
AlgorithmWalletCertificate.  A device certificate may be generated by invoking the following 
command: 
 
%> java edu.rit.tb.security.cert.CertificateAuthority –generate \ 
<caFile> <startDate> <endDate> <id> <walletCertFile> \ 
<privateWalletFile> 
 
Note: ‘\’ denotes a line continuation; there should be no newlines in the argument list. 
 
Argument descriptions: 
 
<caFile> - The file in which the serialized contents of the certificate authority created in 
the previous step are stored. 
 
<startDate> - The date this certificate becomes valid.  Format: mm/dd/yyyy 
 
<endDate> - The date this certificate expires.  Format: mm/dd/yyyy 
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<id> - The ID of the user of device for which the certificate is being generated.  This 
should be unique within the group. 
 
<walletCertFile> - The file to which the resulting AlgorithmWalletCertificate object will be 
serialized for persistent storage. 
 
<privateWalletFile> - The file to which the resulting AlgorithmWallet object will be 
serialized for persistent storage. 
 
The program will deserialize the specified certificate authority and create a new 
AlgorithmWallet.  This wallet, containing the private group public key encryption algorithm, 
user signature algorithm and user public key encryption algorithm, and an 
AlgorithmWalletCertificate created from the public instances of its algorithms are then serialized 
to disk at the locations specified.  Generation of a 2048 bit RSA/RSAWithDoubleSHA256 
certificate takes approximately 8-10 minutes on a 650MHz SparcV9 CPU or 1 minute on a 
1.8GHz Pentium M CPU. 
 
 
Example: 
 
%> java edu.rit.tb.security.cert.CertificateAuthority –generate 
groupOne.ca 06/07/2007 07/07/2007 user1 user1.cert user1.wallet 
 
Creating user encryption & signature public and private key pairs... 
 
Writing certificate to /home/stu9/s15/krm4686/courses/msproj/ 
data/user1.cert... 
 
Writing wallet to /home/stu9/s15/krm4686/courses/msproj/ 
data/user1.wallet... 
 
%> 
 
 
 
Generate a Music Collection 
 
Once a certificate and wallet have been generated as in the previous step the user is now 
capable of interacting with an arbitrary group.  In order to participate in a music group 
however some additional certificates are required – that of a provider and subscriber.  The 
first step in generating these is to create a MusicCollection object.  This is a list of all artists, 
albums and songs a provider or subscriber is permitted to upload or download respectively.  
To generate a music collection: 
 
%> java edu.rit.tb.music.meta.MusicCollection <albumsFile> \ 
<songsFile> <artistsFile> <outFile> 
 
Note: ‘\’ denotes a line continuation; there should be no newlines in the argument list. 
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Argument descriptions: 
 
<albumsFile> - The text file containing authorized albums.  Each line should be formatted 
so it may be parsed into an AlbumInfo object through the AlbumInfo.fromAlbumInfoString() 
method.  Format: year;;;artistName;;;albumName 
 
<songsFile> - The text file containing authorized individual songs.  Each line should be 
formatted so it may be parsed into a SongInfo object through the SongInfo.fromSongInfoString() 
method.  Format: year;;;artistName;;;albumName:::trackNumber:::title 
 
<artistsFile> - The text file containing authorized artists.  Each line should contain a single 
string representing the artist’s name.  Format: artistName 
 
<outFile> - The file to which the resulting MusicCollection object will be serialized for 
persistent storage. 
 
 
The program will parse the three input files into their appropriate collections 
(AlbumCollection, SongCollection and ArtistCollection respectively).  A new MusicCollection object 
created from these collections is then serialized to disk at the specified location. 
 
 
Example: 
 
%> java edu.rit.tb.music.meta.MusicCollection albums.txt songs.txt 
artists.txt user1.mc 
 
Parsing album collection... 
 
Parsing song collection... 
 
Parsing artist collection... 
 
Writing music collection to /home/stu9/s15/krm4686/courses/msproj/ 
data/user1.mc... 
 
%> 
 
 
Generate a Music Authorizations Certificate 
 
Now that a music collection has been generated certificates may be created for participation 
in the music group.  Class edu.rit.tb.music.cert.MusicCertificateAuthority contains a main method 
capable of generating provider and subscriber certificates using the music collection created 
in the previous step and the certificate authority created a few steps back.  
MusicAuthorizationCertificates for both roles are created in the following manner: 
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%> java edu.rit.tb.music.cert.MusicCertificateAuthority –<role> \ 
<caFile> <startDate> <endDate> <id> <musicCollectionFile> \ 
<ouputCertFile> 
 
Note: ‘\’ denotes a line continuation; there should be no newlines in the argument list. 
 
Argument descriptions: 
 
<role> - The role granted by this certificate.  Must be one of ‘provider’ or ‘subscriber’. 
 
<caFile> - The file in which the serialized contents of the CertificateAuthority are stored. 
 
<startDate> - The date this certificate becomes valid.  Format: mm/dd/yyyy 
 
<endDate> - The date this certificate expires.  Format: mm/dd/yyyy 
 
<id> - The ID of the user of device for which the certificate is being generated.  This must 
match the ID contained in the user’s AlgorithmWalletCertificate. 
 
<musicCollectionFile> - The file in which the serialized contents of the MusicCollection 
object created in the last step are stored. 
 
<outputCertFile> - The file to which the resulting MusicAuthorizationCertificate object will 
be serialized for persistent storage. 
 
 
The program will deserialize the specified CA and music collection objects from disk and 
then create and sign a new MusicAuthorizationCertificate for the specified role.  The certificate 
is then serialized to disk at the specified location. 
 
 
Example: 
 
%> java edu.rit.tb.music.cert.MusicCertificateAuthority -subscriber 
groupOne.ca 06/07/2007 09/07/2007 user1 user1.mc user1.sub       
 
Loading certificate authority... 
 
Loading music collection... 
 
Creating certificate... 
 
Writing certificate to /home/stu9/s15/krm4686/courses/msproj/ 
data/user1.sub... 
 
%> 
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Join a Music Group (Command Line Client) 
 
Once all the previous steps have been completed it will be possible to run the MusicGroup 
application.  There are two versions of the application – a text based command line client 
and a Swing based graphical client.  This section describes how to use the command line 
version. 
 
%> java edu.rit.tb.music.MusicGroupCMD <userID> <groupID> <certDir> \  
[-provider <musicLibDir>] [-subscriber <musicLibDir>] 
 
Note: ‘\’ denotes a line continuation; there should be no newlines in the argument list. 
 
Argument descriptions: 
 
<userID> - The unique identifier of the user participating in the group. 
 
<groupID> - The identifier of the group to be joined.  This corresponds to the name of the 
CA which generated the specified user’s certificates. 
 
<certDir> - The directory containing all relevant certificate files necessary for group 
participation.   
 
[-provider <musicLibDir>] – This argument set specifies that the application enable the 
provider role.  All valid MusicAuthorizationCertificate files located in the certificate directory 
will be loaded.  All authorized song files located in the specified music library directory or 
any of its subdirectories will be added to the provider’s list of available songs. 
 
[-subscriber <musicLibDir>] – This argument set specifies that the application enable 
the subscriber role.  All valid MusicAuthorizationCertificate files located in the certificate 
directory will be loaded.  All song files located in the specified music library directory or any 
of its subdirectories will be added to the subscriber’s current media list. 
 
Note: At least one of these role argument sets must be specified.  It is also valid to specify 
both.   
 
On start up the application will search for and deserialize the user’s certificate and wallet 
files, enable the specified role(s), load each role’s song collection metadata, and join the 
group.  It will then prompt for input and respond to user commands as they are entered.  
For additional details on the protocol for joining a group and other group interaction 
including sending messages and transferring files please refer to the MusicGroup Application 
Design & Implementation section, found earlier in this document.  
 
 
Example: 
 
%> java edu.rit.tb.music.MusicGroupCMD user1 groupOne data/ 
-provider music/ -subscriber music/ 
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[Initializing application manager...] 
 
[Reading existing group data...] 
 
[No existing group data found.  Creating new group...] 
 
[Subscriber online: user1] 
 
[Provider online: user1] 
 
> _ 
 
 
The application is now fully initialized and ready to process user commands. 
 
 
System Messages 
 
As the command line client is being used various system messages will be displayed to the 
console.  All system messages are contained within square brackets like this: 
 
[system message] 
 
Examples of system messages include provider and subscriber online and offline 
notifications, download requests, group key exchange information and incoming private and 
group messages.  
 
 
Available Commands: 
 
The list of commands the application responds to may be accessed by typing ‘help’ 
 
> help 
 
Available commands: 
========================= 
 
download <provider> \    Download the specified song 
"<artist - title>" "<path>"   
 
gm <message>      Send a message to all group users 
 
help       Print this menu 
 
list <all | my | providerID>   View available song library 
 
online <providers | subscribers>   View users currently online 
 
pm <id> <message>     Send a message to user 'id' 
 
quit       Quit the application 
 
search <all | providerID> \   Search function 
<artist | album | title> \ 
<string>   
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Who’s Online? 
 
A good place to start when using the application is to see what other subscribers and 
providers are online.  While system messages are generated each time a new user enters or 
leaves the group it is sometimes convenient to get the list of all currently participating users.  
To do so use the ‘online’ command: 
 
> online subscribers 
 
Subscribers online: 
==================== 
user1 
user2 
user3 
user4 
 
> _ 
 
The same syntax is used to view the list of providers currently online by replacing 
‘subscribers’ with ‘providers’. 
 
Providers online: 
================== 
user1 
user2 
user3 
user4 
 
> _ 
 
 
What Songs are Available? 
 
Since this is a music sharing client it is useful to be able to browse the available catalogs for 
each provider currently online.  This functionality is implemented through the ‘list’ 
command.  There are three different versions of this command. 
 
To view the songs currently available from all providers in the group: 
 
> list all 
 
user1’s library: 
================= 
the american analog set – aaron and maria 
mono – the flames beyond the cold mountain 
 
user2’s library: 
================= 
explosions in the sky – first breath after coma 
mono – yearning 
 
> _ 
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To view the songs currently available from a specific provider: 
 
> list user2 
 
user2’s library: 
================= 
explosions in the sky – first breath after coma 
mono – yearning 
 
> _ 
 
 
To view the songs in my library: 
 
> list my 
 
user1’s library: 
================= 
the american analog set – aaron and maria 
mono – the flames beyond the cold mountain 
 
> _ 
 
 
 
 
Music Search 
 
Manually browsing through the output of the ‘list’ command can become tedious, especially 
if providers have large libraries or there are many providers currently online.  The ‘search’ 
command allows querying for specific albums, artists or songs from specific providers or the 
entire group based on the command syntax chosen.  Result matching is performed on a 
substring basis only.  Songs are determined to match the query if the song field (album, artist 
or title) contains the query or vice versa. 
 
To search all providers for a song by title: 
 
> search all title flames beyond the cold mountain 
 
user1’s library: 
================= 
mono – the flames beyond the cold mountain 
 
> _ 
 
 
To search a specific provider for a song by title: 
 
> search user2 title flames beyond the cold mountain 
 
No results found 
 
> _ 
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The previous two queries searched for matches by title.  Artists or albums may also be 
queried by replacing the ‘title’ keyword with ‘artist’ or ‘album’ respectively. 
 
> search all artist explosions 
 
user2’s library: 
================= 
explosions in the sky – first breath after coma 
 
> _ 
 
 
 
Messaging 
 
The application supports two types of messaging protocols.  Group messages are able to be 
received by each user currently participating in the group.  In contrast, private messages are 
only able to be read by their target recipient.  Incoming messages are relayed through the 
system message queue as described earlier in this section. 
 
To send a group message use the ‘gm’ command: 
 
> gm this is a public message 
 
> _ 
 
That command would cause the following system message to appear on each group user’s 
console: 
 
[Public message from user1: this is a public message] 
 
 
To send a private message use the ‘pm’ command: 
 
> pm user2 this is a private message to user2 
 
> _ 
 
That command would cause the following system message to appear on user2’s console: 
 
[Private message from user1: this is a private message to user2] 
 
 
 
Downloading Songs 
 
No file sharing application would be a file sharing application without the ability to 
download songs.  Once a song has been found through either the ‘list’ or ‘search’ commands 
it may be downloaded by using the ‘download’ command. 
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> download user2 “mono – yearning” “/tmp/downloads/mono-yearning.mp3” 
 
> _ 
 
Note the use of quotes to enclose the song to be downloaded and the path to which the 
resulting file will be saved.  These are required for the command to succeed.  The above 
command will initiate a download request with the specified provider for the specified song.  
Provider user2 will receive the following system message: 
 
[Subscriber user1 requesting download of mono – yearning] 
 
The following system messages will be displayed on subscriber user1’s console: 
 
[Download started: mono – yearning] 
 
[Download completed: /tmp/downloads/mono-yearning.mp3] 
 
The above exchange assumes that subscriber user1 is authorized to download the song 
“mono – yearning” and that provider user2 is authorized to provide it.  If either of these are 
not the case error messages will be received instead. 
 
 
Quitting the Application 
 
When finished interacting with the music group simply use the ‘quit’ command. 
 
> quit 
 
%> 
 
All tuple board interactions will be immediately ceased and the application will shutdown, 
returning to the shell from which it was started. 
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Join a Music Group (Graphical Client) 
 
This section describes how to use the Swing based graphical Music Group client.  The 
syntax of this program is identical to that of the command line version. 
 
 
%> java edu.rit.tb.music.MusicGroupGUI <userID> <groupID> <certDir> \  
[-provider <musicLibDir>] [-subscriber <musicLibDir>] 
 
Note: ‘\’ denotes a line continuation; there should be no newlines in the argument list. 
 
 
Argument descriptions: 
 
All arguments are identical to those for the command line client.  Please see the previous 
section for descriptions on the arguments required for the application. 
 
 
Example: 
 
%> java edu.rit.tb.music.MusicGroupGUI user1 groupOne data/ 
-provider music/ -subscriber music/ 
 
 
Fig. 27 – MusicGroup Graphical Client 
 
The graphical client will perform all the same steps as the command line client on startup - 
deserialize the user’s certificate and wallet files, enable the specified role(s), load each role’s 
song collection metadata, and join the group. 
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System Messages 
 
As the graphical client is being used various system messages will be displayed in the status 
bar area at the bottom of the main window.  
 
Examples of system messages include provider and subscriber online and offline 
notifications, download requests, group key exchange information and incoming private and 
group messages.  
 
 
Who’s Online? 
 
A good place to start when using the application is to see what other subscribers and 
providers are online.  While system messages are generated each time a new user enters or 
leaves the group the current group members are also shown in the left zone.  Current 
subscribers appear in the top list, labeled ‘Subscribers Online:’.  Similarly, current providers 
appear in the bottom list, labeled ‘Providers Online:’.     
 
 
Fig. 28 – Current users online appear in the left zone 
 
 
 
What Songs Do I Have? 
 
Since this is a music sharing client it is useful to be able to see what songs are already in the 
user’s library. 
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The current user’s library may be viewed from the ‘My Library’ tab in the center zone, 
pictured below. 
 
 
Fig. 29 – My Library 
 
This tab contains a list of all songs loaded from any <mediaLibrary> arguments found on 
the command line at application start.  (See the beginning of this section for more 
information on arguments).  This view is analogous to the ‘list my’ command in the 
command line version of the client. 
 
Song tables like the one pictured above occur throughout the various tabs in the application.  
All tables may be sorted by clicking on the column header which corresponds to the data 
field to be sorted on.  Clicking once will sort the data in ascending order.  Clicking again will 
sort the data in descending order.  Clicking once more will reset the data to its original 
ordering. 
 
 
 
What Songs Are Available? 
 
Even more useful is the ability to browse the available catalog for each provider currently 
online.  The complete list of all available songs and their providers may be viewed by clicking 
the next tab to the right of ‘My Library’, labeled ‘Group Library’.  This view is analogous to 
the ‘list all’ command in the command line version of the client.  
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Fig. 30 – Group Library 
 
 
Here we can clearly see all the songs available for user2, the only other provider currently 
online.  Note that if the current user is also a provider the corresponding library is excluded 
from this view since all entries will already be shown in the ‘My Library’ view and secondly it 
would not make sense to download a song from oneself.  The above view has also been 
sorted by title in ascending order to illustrate the previously mentioned sorting abilities. 
 
 
 
 
Music Search 
 
Manually browsing through the ‘Group Library’ view can become tedious, especially if 
providers have large libraries or there are many providers currently online.  The search 
interface, located in the next tab to the right, labeled ‘Search’, allows querying for specific 
albums, artists or songs from specific providers or the entire group based on the options 
chosen.  Result matching is performed on a substring basis only.  Songs are determined to 
match the query if the song field (album, artist or title) contains the query or vice versa.  This 
view is analogous to the ‘search’ command in the command line client. 
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Fig. 31 – Search 
 
 
Here we can see the results of searching for the term ‘explosions’ in the artist field of all 
songs in all provider’s libraries.  Queries may also be performed against the title or album 
fields by selecting the appropriate value in the first drop down box.  In addition it is possible 
to search only a single provider rather than all of them.  To do so, simply select the desired 
provider to be searched from the second dropdown box.  When the ‘Search’ button is 
clicked the search is performed, any old results are cleared from the results view and the new 
results are loaded.  If no results match the specified query the results view will simply remain 
empty. 
 
 
 
 
Downloading Songs 
 
No file sharing application would be a file sharing application without the ability to 
download songs.  Song downloads may be initiated from both the Group Library and Search 
views.  In the Group Library simply double click the table row containing the desired song 
and provider.  After a search simply double click the results table row containing the desired 
song and provider.  This action will launch a download prompt similar to that pictured 
below.  This behavior is analogous to invoking the ‘download’ command in the command 
line client. 
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Fig. 32 – Download Prompt 
 
 
Select a suitable place to save the file click the ‘Save’ button to initiate the download request.  
System messages will be displayed in the status bar area both when the transfer begins and 
when it has completed: 
 
Download started: explosions in the sky – your hand in mine 
 
Download completed: <path to file>/explosions in the sky – your hand in mine.mp3 
 
The above exchange assumes that subscriber user1 is authorized to download the song 
“explosions in the sky – your hand in mine” and that provider user2 is authorized to provide 
it.  If either of these are not the case error messages will be received instead. 
 
 
 
Song Transfer Log 
 
A feature unique to the graphical client is the song transfer log.  This view functions as a 
song transfer history and lists all files which have been uploaded or downloaded during the 
current session.  The log is accessible through the fourth tab in the center zone, labeled 
‘Transfers’. 
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Fig. 33 – Song Transfer Log 
 
 
Transactions are broken down into downloads and uploads.  Each list contains an entry for 
each song transferred and the user at the other end of the exchange.  Note that if the current 
user does not have the subscriber role enabled the download log will be empty.  Similarly if 
the current user does not have the provider role enabled the upload log will be empty. 
 
 
 
Messaging 
 
Like the command line client, the graphical client supports two types of messaging 
protocols.  Group messages are able to be received by each user currently participating in the 
group.  In contrast, private messages are only able to be read by their target recipient.  
Incoming messages are relayed through the system message queue and displayed in the 
status bar area as described earlier in this section. 
 
The graphical client also additional interfaces for sending and presenting received messages, 
both public and private.  Private messages may be sent and received from the last tab in the 
center zone, labeled ‘Private Messages’. 
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Fig. 34 – Private & Group Messages 
 
 
Private conversation windows like the one pictured above are automatically created in the 
‘Private Messages’ tab when a new private message is received from another user in the 
group.  To initiate a new private conversation with another group user simply locate the 
user’s ID in one of the online user lists in the left zone and double click.  The private 
message interface will automatically gain focus and a new conversation window will be 
created for the target user.  Sent and received messages are logged in the top text area, while 
messages to be sent are entered in the bottom text area.  The message is sent once the 
‘Enter’ key is typed.  This behavior is analogous to the ‘pm’ command in the command line 
client. 
 
Group messages, or public messages as they are also known are sent and received in the 
‘Group Messages’ pane in the right and final zone.  The behavior of the group message 
interface is identical to that of the private message conversation windows.  Sent and received 
messages are logged in the top text area, while messages to be sent are entered in the bottom 
text area.  The message is sent once the ‘Enter’ key is typed.  This behavior is analogous to 
the ‘gm’ command in the command line client. 
 
 
Quitting the Application 
 
When finished interacting with the music group simply close the application window. 
All tuple board interactions will be immediately ceased and the application will shutdown, 
returning to the shell from which it was started. 
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Developer’s Guide 
 
With the many additions made to the TupleBoard API during the project it is useful to 
provide some developer’s suggestions and small code samples demonstrating how to get the 
most out of the new security functionality. 
 
 
Working with Random Numbers 
 
As mentioned in the section detailing the design and implementation of the newly added 
Helix cipher based pseudorandom number generator HelixRandom, a PRNG’s data is only as 
good as its seed.  When working with this class it is important to initialize it with a proper, 
truly random seed. 
 
Fortunately, Java5 makes it fairly easy to do so.  Class java.security.SecureRandom provides the 
ability to generate seed bytes to be used with other PRNGs.  The underlying manner in 
which these seed bytes are created differs from system to system.  In Linux and UNIX based 
environments there is an entropy source provided at the OS level, through the /dev/random 
or /dev/urandom devices.  The Windows platform has no analogous file, but enables 
randomness to be obtained through the native CryptoAPI[10].  Java uses a system property, 
securerandom.source to control the entropy source when generating seeds.  As long as the value 
of this property is set to “file:/dev/urandom” Java will automatically use the correct entropy 
source for the environment.  This is the default value. 
 
Using HelixRandom is easy.  The following code sample illustrates initializing a new instance 
of the PRNG with seed bytes obtained as describe above and then generating 100 random 
bytes. 
 
 
//Initialize seed generator 
SecureRandom seedGen = new SecureRandom(); 
     
//Generate seed bytes 
byte[] seedBytes = seedGen.generateSeed(48); 
     
//Create new HelixRandom 
HelixRandom helixRand = new HelixRandom(seedBytes); 
     
//Now random bytes may be obtained 
byte[] randomBytes = new byte[100]; 
helixRand.nextBytes(randomBytes); 
 
Fig. 35 – Generating Randomness with HelixRandom 
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Working with Public Key Algorithms 
 
Currently the TupleBoard library supports one public key encryption algorithm – RSA.  
Instances of the algorithm may be obtained through the provided algorithm factory class, 
PKIAlgorithmFactory.  The factory automatically generates the necessary keys according to the 
bit strength specified.  While any number of bits may be used, a value of 2048 is 
recommended as a minimum to achieve a reasonable level of security. 
 
 
//Specify the bit strength of the algorithm to be created 
int bitStrength = 2048; 
 
//Obtain an instance of RSA 
PublicKeyAlgorithm rsa = PKIAlgorithmFactory 
.createEncryptionAlgorithm 
(EncryptionAlgorithms.RSA,  
 bitStrength,  
 helixRand); 
 
Fig. 36 – Obtaining an instance of RSA 
 
 
Once an instance of RSA has been obtained it may be used for encryption.  RSA operates on 
instances of java.math.BigInteger so a plaintext message must be represented as a number p 
such that p <= n, the public RSA modulus.  This conversion is known as a padding scheme.  
Remember that RSA should not be used for bulk encryption operations, but instead for 
exchanging the key for the symmetric algorithm that will do the bulk encryption. 
 
 
//Create the plaintext message 
BigInteger plaintext = new BigInteger(“1234567890”); 
 
//Encrypt the message 
BigInteger ciphertext = rsa.encrypt(plaintext); 
 
//Decrypt the message 
BigInteger decrypted = rsa.decrypt(ciphertext); 
 
//Verify the operation was a success  
if(plaintext.equals(decrypted)) { 
 System.out.println(“Success”); 
} 
 
Fig. 37 – Encryption and Decryption using RSA 
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Working with Digital Signatures 
 
Currently the TupleBoard library supports one signature algorithm – 
RSADoubleSHA256Signature.  Instances of the algorithm may be obtained through the 
provided algorithm factory class, PKIAlgorithmFactory.  The factory automatically generates 
the necessary keys according to the bit strength specified.  While any number of bits may be 
used, a value of 2048 is recommended as a minimum to achieve a reasonable level of 
security. 
 
//Specify the bit strength of the algorithm to be created 
int bitStrength = 2048; 
 
//Obtain an instance of RSADoubleSHA256Signature 
SignatureAlgorithm rsaSignature =  
PKIAlgorithmFactory 
.createEncryptionAlgorithm 
(SignatureAlgorithms.RSAWithDoubleSHA256,    
 bitStrength,  
 helixRand); 
 
Fig. 38 – Obtaining an instance of RSADoubleSHA256Signature 
 
 
Once an instance of the signature algorithm has been obtained it may be used to compute 
signatures.  It is often desired to sign an object, such as a tuple or a certificate.  The 
following example demonstrates this signing process. 
 
//Object to sign 
Serializable toSign = new SomeObject(…); 
 
//Sign object 
byte[] signature = rsaSignature.signObject(toSign); 
 
//Verify signature 
boolean verified = rsaSignature.verifyObject(toSign, signature); 
 
//Verify the operation was a success  
if(verified) { 
 System.out.println(“Success”); 
} 
 
Fig. 39 – Creating and Verifying a Digital Signature 
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Working with Certificates 
 
In order to use the public key algorithms and signature algorithms shown in the examples 
above in a group setting there must be a way to distribute user algorithm data.  In the 
TupleBoard library this is done through a certificate.  The process begins by creating a 
certificate authority. 
     
//Specify the CA’s name.  This can be used as a group identifier 
String caName = “myCA”; 
 
//Specify the file in which the CA will persist 
File caFile = new File(“myCA.ca”); 
   
//Create a CA Signature Algorithm for signing certificates  
SignatureAlgorithm rsaSignature =  
PKIAlgorithmFactory 
.createEncryptionAlgorithm 
(SignatureAlgorithms.RSAWithDoubleSHA256,    
 bitStrength,  
 helixRand); 
       
//Create a public key algorithm to enable groupwide communication 
PublicKeyAlgorithm rsa = PKIAlgorithmFactory 
.createEncryptionAlgorithm 
(EncryptionAlgorithms.RSA,  
 bitStrength,  
 helixRand); 
       
//Create the new CA 
CertificateAuthority c = new CertificateAuthority 
(caName, groupEncryption, signer); 
      
//Serialize the CA to disk for later retrieval 
c.toStream(new FileOutputStream(caFile)); 
 
Fig. 40 – Creating a CA 
 
 
 
With a CA defined it may now be used to generate a certificate for a user.  This next example 
displays the creation of an AlgorithmWallet and an AlgorithmWalletCertificate, allowing the user 
to digitally sign messages and participate in secure communications. 
 
//Specify user name 
String userName = “user1”; 
 
//Specify start date of now 
Calendar now = Calendar.getInstance(); 
Date startDate = now.getTime(); 
   
//Specify end date of a year from now 
now.add(Calendar.YEAR, 1); 
Date endDate = now.getTime(); 
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//Specify file to store private wallet 
File walletFile = new File(“user1.wallet”); 
 
//Specify file to store certificate 
File certFile = new File(“user1.cert”); 
 
//Load the CA from disk 
CertificateAuthority c = CertificateAuthority.fromStream 
(new FileInputStream(caFile)); 
       
//Create the wallet and certificate 
c.createAlgorithmWalletCertificate 
(startDate, 
 endDate, 
 username, 
 certFile, 
 walletFile); 
 
Fig. 41 – Creating a Certificate 
 
 
 
Working with Secure TupleBoard 
 
The previous examples give insight into creation and use of some of the security primitives 
added to the API.  To show how all of these features interact the final example demonstrates 
the design of a custom tuple, its signing, its encrypted transfer through the tuple board and 
its authentication.  This example assumes two certificates sets have been generated as in the 
previous example, for users with id’s user1 and user2.  First, we define the sample tuple. 
 
 
/** 
 * This class represents a very simple extension of SignedTuple, 
 * providing only a simple message field of type String. 
 */ 
public class SecureExampleTuple extends SignedTuple { 
 
 /** 
  *Tuple payload – a simple String message 
  */ 
 public final String message; 
 
 
 /** 
* Template constructor.  This constructor is suitable for     
* creating default templates.  The message field is initialized 
* to null. 
       */ 
 public SecureExampleTuple() { 
  this.final = null; 
} 
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/** 
 * Tuple constructor.  This constructor is suitable for creating  
 * a tuple with a message for posting.  Instances of this class  
 * may not be created using this constructor.  Instead, use the  
 * provided factory create method. 
 */ 
protected SecureExampleTuple(AlgorithmWalletCertificate cert, 
String message) { 
 super(cert); 
this.message = message; 
} 
 
 
/** 
 * Factory create method.  A new instance of this tuple is 
 * created with the specified certificate and message.  The tuple 
 * is signed using the specified algorithm before being returned. 
 */ 
public static SecureExampleTuple create 
(AlgorithmWalletCertificate cert, 
  String message, SignatureAlgorithm sigAlg)  
 throws IOException { 
 
 //Create tuple 
 SecureExampleTuple set = new SecureExampleTuple 
(cert, message); 
  
 //Sign tuple 
set.sign(sigAlg); 
 
//Return 
return set; 
} 
} 
 
 
With the tuple defined we may now write the code necessary for transferring one from user1 
to user2.  It is assumed that the both users’ certificates are locally available for this example.  
First the posting code for user1: 
 
//Read in my certificate 
AlgorithmWalletCertificate myCert = AlgorithmWalletCertificate. 
fromStream(new FileInputStream(new File(“user1.cert”))); 
 
//Read in my wallet 
AlgorithmWallet myWallet = AlgorithmWallet.fromStream 
(new FileInputStream(new File(“user1.wallet”))); 
 
//Read in user2’s certificate 
AlgorithmWalletCertificate userTwoCert = AlgorithmWalletCertificate. 
fromStream(new FileInputStream(new File(“user2.cert”))); 
 
//Create a new tuple to send 
SecureExampleTuple t = SecureExampleTuple.create 
(myCert, “Hello, user2!”,  
 myWallet.getUserSignatureAlgorithm()); 
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//Create the security context with which to send 
//The security context’s id is based on the target recipient’s 
//certificate 
PublicKeySecurityContext pksc = new PublicKeySecurityContext 
(new CertificateSecurityContextId(userTwoCert), 
userTwoCert.getUserEncryptionAlgorithm(), 
helixRand); 
 
//Create the tuple board 
TupleBoard board = new TupleBoard(); 
 
//Post tuple and wait 
board.post(t, pksc); 
Thread.currentThread().join(); 
 
 
 
Now the reading code for user2: 
 
//Read in my certificate 
AlgorithmWalletCertificate myCert = AlgorithmWalletCertificate. 
fromStream(new FileInputStream(new File(“user2.cert”))); 
 
//Read in user2’s certificate 
AlgorithmWalletCertificate userOneCert = AlgorithmWalletCertificate. 
fromStream(new FileInputStream(new File(“user1.cert”))); 
 
 
//Create the security context with which to read 
//The security context’s id is based on my certificate 
PublicKeySecurityContext pksc = new PublicKeySecurityContext 
(new CertificateSecurityContextId(myCert), 
myCert.getUserEncryptionAlgorithm(), 
helixRand); 
 
//Create the tuple board 
TupleBoard board = new TupleBoard(); 
 
//Read tuple 
SecureExampleTuple received = board.read(new SecureExampleTuple()); 
 
//Verify signature and print message 
if(received.isAuthentic(myCert. 
getCASignatureVerificationAlgorithm())) { 
  
 System.out.println(“Message: ” + received.message); 
} 
 
Fig. 42 – Working with Secure TupleBoard 
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Deliverables 
 
The following is a list of all deliverables for this project: 
 
• Required Libraries 
o jid3lib-0.5.4.jar – Java ID3 Tag Library 
o AbsoluteLayout.jar – Netbeans Swing Absolute Positioning Support 
• Source Code 
o tbsrc.jar – Secure TupleBoard API 
o musicgroupsrc.jar – MusicGroup Application 
• Executables 
o tb.jar – Secure TupleBoard API 
o musicgroup.jar – MusicGroupApplication 
• Documentation 
o Secure TupleBoard JavaDoc 
o MusicGroup Application JavaDoc 
o Final Report (this document) 
• Data 
o Certificate Authority 
o User Certificates 
o Performance Evaluation Script 
 
All deliverables mentioned in this section as well as all other documents generated during the 
course of this project may be found on my project website at 
http://www.cs.rit.edu/~krm4686/msproj/ 
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Future Work 
 
I am fairly happy with the results of this project but as with any project there is always 
additional work that can be done.  The public key framework added to the TupleBoard 
library was designed to easily allow future extensions.  The addition of additional algorithms 
to this framework would prove an interesting investigation.  RSA is a very well known 
algorithm and has been in use for many years.  Recently there has been interest in a new type 
of public key algorithm based on elliptic curves.  Much like RSA, these algorithms can be 
used for encryption as well as digital signatures. 
 
Similarly, it may be interesting to add additional symmetric key algorithms to the library.  
This would require a new layer of abstraction to allow security contexts to work with 
algorithms besides Helix, the only one currently supported.  AES, the Advanced Encryption 
Standard, or Phelix, a new revised version of Helix may be good places to start. 
 
Writing this final report has also given me some additional perspective on the project as a 
whole.  There are a few things I would do differently if starting again.  Currently 
authorization is only supported at the application level.  It would be beneficial to integrate a 
role based authorization mechanism directly into the TupleBoard.  I would also create a set 
of SignedTupleListeners which would extend the PostListeners and PostWithdrawListeners to allow 
for automatic authentication of read tuples before triggering posted events. 
 
Both the application and the library were designed and developed for Java5.  Upgrading to 
Java6 would provide some interface improvements and simplifications for the graphical 
client due to additions to the javax.swing package.  Automatic table sorting and filtering as 
well as custom rendering on menu tab strips to enable close buttons on the private 
conversation tabs would be the first things that could be improved. 
 
Finally, as with any trust based system there are some assumptions made regarding observing 
protocols and behaving in the expected manner.  This illustrates the importance of a 
certificate authority only distributing certificates to users known to be good.  While it is 
impossible to prevent all misuse, an easy improvement would be the inclusion of mp3 file 
hashing in the authorization certificates.  This could prevent the modification of ID3 tag 
data in files to allow distribution of files masquerading as authorized files between users.  
But again this can do little to stop malicious activity between colluding users since it would 
be easy to sidestep the protocols in place. 
 
I think the secure TupleBoard provides an excellent ad hoc collaborative application base 
and am interested to see what additional projects are done using it and extending it. 
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